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Article 5

COMMENTS
AN ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL VERDICT: RES
JUDICATA APPLIED IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
By

WILLIAM J. KNOWLES*

Introduction
You can't do this to me! But they did, nevertheless: the little man who
wasn't there can be found serving time in one of the Ohio penitentiaries.
In State v. Ortk, Orth had been indicted, tried and acquitted of first
degree murder. His only defense had been alibi. In the flush of his victory,
he must have considered the matter closed. Far from it, for he was subsequently indicted, tried and convicted of robbery. Both the homicide and
the robbery arose from the same transaction. Orth managed to obtain a
retrial on the robbery charge. In his new trial he attempted to plead once
in jeopardy, but the plea was denied. On an inspiration, then, he invoked
res judicata; surely a man cannot commit a robbery if he is not presentl
The court refused to adopt this theory of the situation and ruled against
such a plea. To this ruling Orth assigned error on appeal. Ohio law permitted only five pleas: guilty, not guilty, once in jeopardy, not guilty by
reason of insanity, and a former judgment of conviction or acquittal of the
offense.

2

The majority opinion in the Orth case limited res judicata to the same
scope as the plea of former judgment and denied its application in this case
because the offense was different. They further reasoned that since the
verdict of not guilty only indicated the jury had a reasonable doubt of
Orth's guilt, the judgment on that verdict could not have any value as
res judicata of the issue of his Presence. The view was taken that the matter
of Orth's presence was only one of many issues presented at the murder
trial, none of which were specifically settled. The point was well taken,
having much support in the authorities,3 so far as it went.
A vigorous dissent in the Orth case was based on the point that the
defense of alibi denied nothing except the presence of the accused and that
no other fact was put in issue. It was said that the jury had only to determine whether or not Orth participated in the commission of the offense.
Thus the acquittal, deductively, must have determined Orth was not present. This view also finds substantial support in the authorities.4
* Member, Second-Year Class.

1153 N.E. 394 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
2 OHIO REV. CODE

§ 2943.03;

see also CAL. PEN. CODE

§ 1016.

8 State v. Rose, 89 Ohio St. 383, 106 N.E. 50 (1914) ; Duvall v. State, 111 Ohio St. 657,
146 N.E. 90 (1924) ; Patterson v. State, 96 Ohio St. 90, 117 N.E. 169 (1917).
4 Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E. 2d 573 (1941) ; see 147 A.L.R. 980.
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The Problem
When a criminal act is of such severity as to amount to a felony, it is
rare, under modern statutes, that only one felonious feature arises. Many
of these features are essential to a given offense, being "lesser included offenses." Others are entirely independent in nature, although they may have
one or more common elements.5 As to the lesser included offenses, once an
accused has been put on trial and been "in jeopardy of life and limb" he may
be able to escape a future prosecution by pleas of former jeopardy, autrefois
acquit, or autrefois convict.'
Such is not the case, however, when an accused faces a second indictment or information charging a joint or concurrent offense, arising out of
the same transaction.' A robbery resulting in a homicide gives rise to a
charge of first degree murder.8 The accused could be tried for the murder
or the robbery. Can he be subjected to a complete review of the evidence,
de novo, at a later trial for one offense in the event of a prior acquittal as to
the other? Is he permitted to defy a prior conviction and urge a defense
previously adjudged destitute of merit? If res judicata is as completely
available in a criminal proceeding as in a civil action, it would seem both
questions should be answered negatively.
Conceding that res judicata is available in a criminal proceeding, 9 the
problem remains to determine the extent to which it may be applied. The
cases and authorities are not in harmony as to the proper place of this plea
in a criminal action. Some cases apply it liberally; others restrict the doctrine narrower than the rules obtaining in former jeopardy. They are so
rife with uncertainty and conflict that even the Restatement of the Law
of Judgments expressly excepts criminal rules from its scope. 10
Invoking Res .udicata
In a given fact situation, where the life or liberty of the accused hangs
in the balance, a doctrine which has its roots in stability and its limbs in
public policy should not be so difficult of application as cases such as Orth
make it seem. If there is doubt as to the proper application of res judicata,
it seems fundamental in our jurisprudence that such doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.
This discussion will emphasize the application of the doctrine of res
judicata on behalf of an accused. The basic rules are the same for either
prosecution or defense,:" tempered only by the basic presumption of inno5
E.g., robbery-homicide and robbery both have attempted robbery as a common element,
but only in robbery is it a lesser included offense. See CAL. PEN. CoDE §§ 211; 189.

o10 H[AsTGs LJ. 188 (1958).

7 State v. Dills, 210 N.C. 178, 185 S.E. 677 (1936).

8 CAL. PEN. CODE § 189.
9 United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S.
575 (1948).
10
REsTATzmENT, JuDGmENTs (1942) (Scope Note).
11
See Estate of Bell, 153 Cal. 332, 340, 95 Pac. 372, 376 (1908). This is the rule in civil
cases; it is uncertain what would be the effect of the presumption of innocence in criminal law;
no case in point has been found.
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cence and the prosecution's burden of proof, both of which are subservient
to res judicata.
Approaching Res JudicataIn Crimial Cases
The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that in criminal
and civil proceedings' 2
... [A] question of fact or law distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot afterwards be disputed
between the same parties.
In a criminal proceeding the state or government is one of the parties.
Perhaps this self evident fact is sometimes disregarded when the representatives are changed or the indictment varies. Unless such disregard is imputed
to many opinions, this writer falls to find a logical explanation for the summary disposals of res judicata in those opinions where it seems applicable. 3
Res judicata applies to all matters existing at the time the judgment is
rendered which the parties have had an opportunity to bring before the
court. 4 The judgment is conclusive not only as to matters actually presented but as to every other matter which might have been presented 5
..as incident to, or essentially connected with, the subject matter coming
within the legitimate purview of the original action....
These may be specific issues or essential elements of an ultimate issue. It
does not refer to irrelevant or collateral points which were not presented or
could not have been presented to support or deny a right.' Merely because
a verdict is general on the merits does not prevent an analysis of the substance of the case to determine just what were the essentials. Properly
understood, the doctrine would requiresuch an analysis. An analysis would
reveal that res judicata could not apply to later arising rights separate from
those involved in the judgment.' Cases which limit res judicata to the
actual issues presented in criminal trials usually are distinguishable on
their facts as situations where there was no foundation for the doctrine in
the first place,'" the limiting language thus amounting to dictum.
The doctrine is of such great moment that it may give the character of
truth or finality to a matter which may in fact not deserve this quality.
Unless directly attacked on appeal an erroneous judgment is as conclusive
as a correct one. 19
Res judicata is a double-pronged doctrine. On the one hand, where the
12 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 334 (1915).
13 See Commonwealth v. Crecorian, 264 Mass. 94, 162 N.E. 7 (1928).
14 State v. Torinus, 9 N.W. 725, 728 (Minn. 1881) ; Quirk v. Rooney, 130 Cal. 505, 511, 62
Pac. 825, 827 (1900).
15
Estate of Bell, 153 Cal. 331, 95 Pac. 372 (1908).
16 Emerson v. Yosemite Gold Mining & Co., 149 Cal. 50, 57, 85 Pac. 122, 125 (1906).
17 State v. Torinus, 9 N.W. 725, 728 (Minn. 1881) ; Quirk v. Rooney, 130 Cal. 505, 511, 62
Pac. 825, 827 (1900).
18 See People v. Ashrawy, 130 Cal. App. 145, 149, 19 P.2d 536, 538 (1933).
19 Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., 21 Cal. 2d 636, 134 P.2d 242 (1943).
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cause of action or indictment and the parties are the same, a prior judgment
is a complete bar to the subsequent action or indictment." On the other
hand, where the cause of action or indictment is different but the parties are
the same, the doctrine of res judicata renders conclusive matters which
were decided by the first judgment, operating as an estoppel. Of course,
in a criminal proceeding, if the matter were decisive of the case, it would
seem res judicata could be pleaded in bar even though the indictment was
different.
Can it be seriously contended that res judicatahas no place, or even that
it should be limited, in criminal proceedings? Consider this statement of
the policy behind the doctrine:' 2
... [Rles judicata is not a mere rule of procedure, but a rule of justice
unlimited in operation, which must be enforced whenever its enforcement is
necessary for the protection of rights and the preservation of the repose of
society, based on the grounds that there should be an end to litigation, and
that a person should not be twice vexed for the same cause. (Emphasis
added.)
Res judicata is basically a simple doctrine which has undergone no
mutations since its earliest application in a criminal case.2 Misunderstanding, however, has prevented its universal application in American law. The
usual limitation arises in the form of a proposition that res judicatadoes not
exist for criminal cases except in the modified form of the fifth amendment
of the federal Constitution, and that the plea in bar cannot prevent a second
trial when defendant has never been in jeopardy.' In Oppenheimer v.
United States,' Mr. Justice Holmes attacked this proposition by saying that
the mere statement of the position should be its own answer. He observed: 20
Where a criminal charge has been adjudicated upon by a court having
jurisdiction ...

it is final as to the matter adjudicated ...

and may be

pleaded in bar .... In this respect the criminal law is in unison with that
which prevails in civil proceedings. (Emphasis added.)
One might contend that such a view would have no force in a state court.
Such a position had been anticipated by Holmes, at least by cogent inference. He stated that the fifth amendment was not intended to do away with
what is a fundamental principle of justice to enable the government to
prosecute a second time.-" Fundamental principles of justice are universal;
they are not restricted solely to federal courts. This writer is of the opinion
20 Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Cal. 2d 195, 201, 99 P.2d 652, 655 (1940) ; Todhunter v. Smith, 219
Cal. 690, 694, 28 P.2d 916, 918 (1934) ; 26 St. B.J. 366.

21 Ibid.
22

In Re Walsh's Estate, 80 N.J.E. 565, 570, 74 Atl. 563, 566 (1909).
23 Rex. v. Duchess of Kingston, 20 HoweU's State Trials 538, 2 Smith's Leading Cases, Part
2, 734, 784 (8th ed. 1776).
24Patterson v. State, 96 Ohio St. 90, 117 N.E. 169 (1917).
25242 U.S. 85, 87 (1916).
26 Ibid.
2

7tbid.
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that those words are an invitation to appeal a case under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment whenever the doctrine of res judicata
is disparaged and pre-emptorily disposed of in the court of last resort of
the state.
The GeneralVerdict
Courts are frequently reluctant to seek an issue beneath the surface of a
judgment to which res judicata may properly be applied. It is astounding
that the doctrine can be so grossly ignored on pretexts of one sort or
another. For example, in Commonwealth v. Crecorian the court passed it
off in the following way:2"
The acts charged in the first indictment would not have warranted a verdict
of guilty on the facts charged in the (second) indictment.... The crimes
charged were not identical. (Emphasis added.)
Even the plea of once in jeopardy is not this restrictive!
Contrast this to the California case of Oliver v. Superior Court, where
res judicata was applied to a very unusual degree in barring prosecution
for conspiracy. The accused presented the record of the prior trial which
disclosed that the overt act alleged in the conspiracy indictment (for purposes of satisfying the statutory requisite of that offense) was the very
crime of which he had been generally acquitted in the former trial. Surely
an acquittal of the substantive offense does not preclude the existence of a
conspiracy, a different offense, or even an attempt, a lesser included offense.
Yet in Oliver the second trial was barred by the plea because the indictment
alleged a completed offense rather than merely some overt act falling short
of the offense. Any overt act would have been adequate. On the face of the
indictment, however, it could be demonstrated that an essential allegation
had been resolved in favor of the accused at a prior trial.
Issues Within the Scope of a GeneralVerdict
What are the matters in a prior record which cannot be re-argued?
Four factors might be considered in approaching a record to determine
what issues must have been settled by judgment: concessions, admissions,
stipulations and "reasonable certainties." If a relevant fact in the case for
the state is conceded to the state by the accused, it is a part of the judg31
ment." Likewise, an admission of a relevant fact is part of the judgment.
Along with relevant stipulations,' these are parts of the decision on the
merits. Since they were not put in issue at the first trial, they cannot be put
in issue in a later proceeding between the same parties. 3 The reasoning
28 264 Mass. 94, 95, 162 N.E. 7, 8 (1928).
29 92 Cal. App. 94, 267 Pac. 764 (1928).
30 Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 580 (1948).
8' Johnson v. Fontana County F.P. Dist., 15 Cal. 2d 380, 389, 101 P.2d 1092, 1097 (1940).
3
2 McCreary v. Fuller, 63 Cal. 30 (1883), Aff'd. 119 U.S. 327 (1886).
33 Donner v. Palmer, 51 Cal. 629, 637 (1877).
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behind this is logical. In a practical sense, these matters are basic or
essential to the judgment.3 4 They cannot be altered for purposes of obtaining a contrary result on an issue to which they are fundamental and which
has already been adjudgedV 5
The application of "reasonable certainties" is not as readily apparent.
If the issue had to be determined by the jury in order to arrive at their
verdict, the judgment is a final determination of the issue. 6 But is an issue
within the "domain of the jury" if the conflict is only superficial or unrealistic? If not an issue which the jury had to determine, how is the
"reasonable certainty" applicable in the determination of the essential
issues passed upon by the jury? This writer is of the opinion that a misconceived regard for the function of the jury is at the root of the problem in
analyzing a jury's "reasonable doubt" and offers the following rationale of
that problem.
Domain of the Jury
The jury is probably the closest approximation the law has for the
"reasonably prudent man" upon whom it relies to resolve questions of fact
about which reasonable men could differ. The law is not concerned with
the reasoning of the individual jurors; it is the result of their cumulative
effort which is sought. The jury is analagous to a computing machine: facts
and variables are fed into it; they are run through its circuits; an answer
comes out in the terms desired. The "dials" of the "jury-machine" are preset by instructions from the court to indicate what the legal consequences of
certain cumulative facts and variables must be, so that the "answer" given
is in terms of law: "guilty" or "not guilty." Yet, in the final analysis, it is
fact which is determined 3 7 The key here is that this "jury-machine" is used
only to decide facts or issues over which reasonable men could differ.38 If
reasonable men could not differ, it may be assumed that the "jury-machine," replacing the reasonably prudent man, also would not differ. Some
facts are fed into it during the course of the trial for which its operation
may, in fact, not be needed at all when viewed at the close of the evidence.
Thus, in analyzing the verdict, these issues should be set aside as matters
upon which the jury did not deliberate but used only as foundation material.
It is well known that an appellate court may reverse a decision on findings
which are clearly "not supported by the evidence." It would seem that such
"reasonable certainties" should be added to the list of necessary fundamentals to the verdict, along with concessions, admissions and stipulations.
They become part of the foundation for applying resjudicata.
This rationale is especially significant when it is considered that jurors
do in fact differ as to the reasons for their individual votes. While it may be
34

Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 579 (1948).
35 Ibid.
36 Horton v. Goodenough, 184 Cal. 461, 460, 194 Pac. 34, 38 (1920).
37 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1126.
3
8 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1096.
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true that some jurors might refuse to accept the legal consequences of
certain acts and vote for conviction or acquittal without regard to their own
belief as to the commission or non-commission of acts, such a possibility
must be disregarded. The jury must be regarded as acting in perfect harmony with the "setting of its dials," consistent with the law. To view it
otherwise is to question the very purpose of the jury, or at least the propriety of allowing the general verdict at all. So, the general verdict naturally
should be viewed as if legal consequences were applied with absolute infallibility, and only to those facts about which reasonable men would differ,
after founding them upon undisputed or indisputable allegations and offers
of evidence.
The Analysis
The test of whether the fact or facts decided in a prior proceeding will
bar a second proceeding is not whether it is a successive step in a transaction. It is rather whether the offense charged in the second indictment necessarily involves the fact or offense charged in the first indictment.3 9 If a fact
is a requisite of both offenses, or if the first offense is essential to the second,
res judicata is invoked to bar the second proceeding, assuming the fact or
offense went in favor of the accused in the first trial.40 Thus the fact that a
robbery was committed and then a kidnapping, in one transaction, does
not necessarily give them a mutual connection just because successive. An
attempted robbery, however, is essential to both robbery and robberyhomicide. Under the doctrine of res judicata the accused may be able to
show that his former acquittal on the first charge was necessarily controlled
issue of fact which would preclude
by the determination of some particular
41
his conviction of the second charge.

In some cases it is not possible to invoke res judicata as a complete bar.
Yet a prior judgment is conclusive so far as a later indictment involves
any issue which was essentially decided in the prior action.42 Relevancy of
the issue is the important feature in the proceeding. 43 Of course, if the
issue is not relevant or material to the second action, res judicata would
there have a hollow ring. The accused had been suspected of being the
driver of a get-away car in the robbery-kidnap transaction in People v.
Beltran.44 He was acquitted as a principal in the crime of kidnapping. Later,
in his robbery trial, the court recognized res judicata in its evidentiary
capacity but dismissed it as irrelevant. Under the facts presented in his
prior record the intent or knowledge needed for the kidnapping conviction
could be wholly lacking and still not affect guilt of the accused as a principal
in the crime of robbery.
30 Commonwealth v. Moon, 151 Pa. Super. 555, 30 A.2d 704 (1943) ; Commonwealth v.
Bonmiller, 186 Pa. Super. 99, 140 A.2d 860 (1958).
40
United States v. Waldin, 253 F.2d 551, 555 (3d Cir. 1948) (dissenting opinion).
41
Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E. 2d 573 (1941).
4 Todhunter v. Smith, 219 Cal. 690, 694, 28 P.2d 916, 918 (1934).
43 Guardianship of Leach, 30 Cal. 2d 297, 182 P.2d 529 (1947).
44 94 Cal. App. 2d 197, 210 P.2d 239 (1949).
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The jury is going to say "guilty" or "not guilty." The facts will have
been considered, specifically or generally in unknown degree. There is no
general rule which can be invoked to say just which of particular facts must
have been determined in any trial for a given offense. Only by a close
scrutiny of the record of the trial and by a careful, thoughtful analysis can
the attorney hope to find in the record of the prior trial the settled issues
which might be of some assistance to his client in a later trial. It cannot be
said without looking into the specific case whether or not res judicata will
be available at all. It will not appear with the regularity and precision as
may be expected in applying the plea of former jeopardy. But the attorney
may take heart in the knowledge that he is not necessarily defeated just
because the plea of former jeopardy is not available.
The Multi-Offense Transaction
Merely establishing that res judicata applies in a criminal case to the
same extent as in a civil action does no more than allow the doctrine in a
proper case. It still remains to determine if a given case can be proper in
view of the type of situation the facts present. If it can, is it in fact a
proper one?
It would seem unlikely that res judicata would have any application to
an event or transaction disconnected from the one giving rise to an indictment. This narrows its application to two possible situations. The first is
illustrated by the Orth case, the robbery-homicide: statutory first degree
murder, having attempted robbery as a pre-requisite. These might be designated as "joint" offenses. The second is represented by the Beltran case,
where successive crimes were committed in the same transaction. This might
be designated as a "collateral" or "concurrent" offensive transaction. In
both cases mentioned res judicata was not allowed. Orth excluded the
doctrine as not being applicable no matter what the facts might have been.
Beltran excluded it on the basis of the particular fact situation. Without
questioning the result in either case, it may be asked, which, if either, of the
cases reasoned correctly. The answer requires an offer of hypothetical facts.
The Joint Offense
Four eye-witnesses might testify that they were present at a robbery;
that they were in the bank where it occurred; that they saw the robber
shoot the teller as he resisted; that the deceased was the man shot. If none
of them were impeached this evidence would be very convincing that a
homicide resulted from a robbery. A fifth witness might corroborate this
testimony, he being a disinterested passer-by. It might be said that in such
a case the evidence did not admit of any other conclusion but that a homicide did result from the robbery. As to that, reasonable men could not differ.
It would be immaterial to this point that no witness could describe the
alleged felons.
In order to convict D of felony murder in the above situation where his
plea is "not guilty," it is necessary to prove that he attempted robbery and
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that a homicide resulted therefrom. 45 The determination of the latter issue
need not be submitted to the jury because of its reasonable certainty. The
jury need only decide whether or not D committed acts sufficient to constitute attempted robbery as alleged. If the jury returned a verdict of "not
guilty" in such a case it would be res judicata that D had not attempted
the robbery, since it was the only issue about which reasonable men might
differ upon the presentation of the record of the trial. In that case, then,
res judicata would be a proper plea in bar to a subsequent robbery trial,
since the necessary element, attempt, had already been adjudged. It would
be immaterial which particular element of the attempt was the source of the
"reasonable doubt" in the murder trial. Each juror might have had a different doubt. It is not essential that it be shown why the jury acquitted D. It
need only be demonstrated from the prior record that the attempt was the
essential issue decided. A denial that D committed acts sufficient to constitute an attempted robbery precludes commission of successful robbery.
D must be acquitted at the second trial.
In the same situation a different result would follow if D had offered
evidence to show that the four occupants of the bank and the passer-by
were all known to be enemies of the deceased, or if he indicated that any of
them had threatened the deceased, or if he impeached the witnesses by
showing collusion. In that event reasonable men might well wonder whether
or not there had been a robbery at all; or whether the death resulted from
the robbery. The witnesses themselves might have used the robbery as a
shield to premeditated murder by themselves after the robbery was over I
Certainly a verdict of "not guilty" would not then be a proper starting point
for analysis with a res judicata objective in mind.4 6 The case simply would
not be a proper one.
The compelling conclusion, then, from this example would be that the
reasoning in the Orth case was faulty in regard to the general application
of res judicata. Yet, one would have to examine that record to decide
whether or not the result was wrong.
The Concurrent Offense
This is a more difficult type of case in which to apply res judicata. Still,
a case can be conceived in which it would be proper. Four men might drive
an armed vehicle with a loudspeaker into Yankee Stadium and announce
that the players were being held up and that hostages would be taken for
ransom as well. If this announced intention were put into effect and thereafter D, suspected as a participant, was brought to trial and acquitted
under an indictment for kidnapping, res judicata might well rear its head.
The testimony of several thousand witnesses that both offenses were committed by the same four men in a single transaction would be hard to
impeach.
45 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1102; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1869.
46 Duvall v. State, 11 Ohio St. 657, 146 N.E. 90 (1924).
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If D faced a subsequent trial for robbery, what might be the outcome?
In the face of such overwhelming evidence that the robbers were also the
kidnappers, it is hard to imagine that a reasonable man could have acquitted D of kidnapping without acquitting him of the act of participation
in the transaction. The consideration given by the jury would not have
dealt with legal essentials or definitions of the individual offenses, they
being admittedly different in every legal aspect. It would have dealt with a
transaction-a fact situation-which was continuing and in which the acts
making up the various elements were themselves in issue. The tremendous
amount of evidence removes virtually everything from the domain of the
jury except the identity of the persons participating in the transaction. It is
the only issue about which reasonable men might differ. This same issue
was resolved in favor of the accused in the prior trial. Only blind legal conceptualism would fly in the face of such a record and look to "legal distinction" between the offenses of robbery and kidnapping.
Yet such a result might not follow in that case if it could be shown or
suggested to any degree of possible belief that the persons abducted were
in fact only accomplices in the robbery transaction, placed in the audience
in reserve in case of difficulty, but not to participate unless needed. Such a
contention must appear in the first trial record to be admissible to defeat
the presumption of the judgment discussed above, since it was an issue
which was "within the legitimate purview"47 of the prior action. That
element appearing, a jury could well believe D committed acts sufficient to
constitute a robbery while having plausible doubts that there was a nonconsensual abduction.
Despite the dramatic unlikelihood of the hypotheticals posed here, perhaps they demonstrate that res judicatacan have its place in the concurrent
offense trial. It seems to favor the reasoning in the Beltran case which did
look into the record of the prior trial before denying the doctrine.
Premeditation
In the joint offense where two grounds are offered for conviction of
murder-robbery-homicide and premeditated murder-res judicata would
still have full value for the accused if he were acquitted. The only distinction is that he would have been adjudged free of guilt on both grounds.
The same analysis discussed herein would apply, if the case was a "proper"
one. However, this would not be so in case of conviction. If D were convicted, only by demonstrating that the robbery-homicide was the basis for
conviction could the judgment have weight for urging res judicatain a subsequent trial for robbery. Such demonstrations might not be possible. So
the state might find it wiser to urge only one ground in the first trial,
depending on which ground seemed stronger, with due consideration for
the possible consequential use of res judicata in the event of acquittal or
conviction.
47

Estate of Bell, 153 Cal. 331, 95 Pac. 372 (1908).
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Summary of Approach
If the interpretation be strained in "proper" cases so that the jury can
be said to have acquitted because it was too squeamish to convict of first
degree murder or some other substantive offense although they did in fact
believe the accused committed the acts legally sufficient to warrant conviction, such reason is inconsistent with the theory that the jury is an impartial
and reasonable fact finder. The result would not be "legally correct" if this
were urged as the possible basis for acquittal. To allow that juries can
disregard legal consequences in this way is to allow that juries are legislators
as well as fact finders. Even if the contention be actually correct, it cannot
be admitted when the admission would undermine a judgment, however
wrong the judgment may have been."8 The "compromise verdict," recognized as such in some jurisdictions, is a different species of result than an
outright acquittal. A compromise verdict might be just what it says: a compromise to avoid a "hung jury," where individual jurors dispute the truth
of certain facts alleged but admit others sufficient to allow conviction for
some lesser included offense. A discussion of such a verdict is not within
the scope of this comment.
The doctrine of res judicata applies to determinations of fact or law in a
given case. 9 An acquittal for the robbery-homicide or other joint or collateral offense arising from the same transaction may render guilt for some
other offense incompatible when the fact is established that both offenses
arose from the same transaction. As was stated in Harrisv. State:0
Where the transactions are the same as a matter of fact, even though the
offenses be not identical . .. (the accused) may nevertheless, under the
principal of res judicata show his acquittal on the first charge was necessarily controlled by the determination of some particular issue

. . .

of fact

which would preclude his conviction of the second charge.
It becomes a matter of reasonableness and logic. The Harris rule is the
"major premise." The record of the prior trial must supply the "minor
premise." If it is a "proper" case the conclusion follows that the accused
cannot be convicted as he has already been adjudged "not guilty."
A Living Example: The Orth Case andAlibi
It has been held that a plea of "not guilty" puts every material allegation of the information or indictment in issue without particular regard to
the nature of the defense interposed." Certainly the state has the burden of
proving every element of the offense, 2 and the sole defense of alibi does not
appear on its face to ease that burden at all.
In the Orth case, had Orth been convicted over his defense of alibi in his
48

Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., 21 Cal. 2d 636, 134 P.2d 242 (1943).

49Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 334 (1915).
0o 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E. 2d 573 (1941).

51 State v. Barton, 5 Wash. 2d 234, 105 P.2d 63 (1940) ; see also CAL. PEN. CODE § 1019.
52 CAL. PEN. CODE §1102; CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1869.
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first trial for murder, and if the state had indicted him for robbery at a
later date, he could not have been heard to say that the conviction was not
res judicata of his guilt of attempted robbery. It would be immaterial that
he had not offered specific evidence to deny the elements essential to establish that the attempt was made by someone. The murder conviction would
not have stood the light of reason if Orth could contest his guilt for attempted robbery, or even that he had been present and participating. It
might be otherwise if there had been any offer of evidence of premeditation
and deliberation. But lacking that, and looking at the case from a logical
and practical standpoint, the state should be relieved of the burden of proof
except as to the issue of successful robbery.5 3 All lesser included offenses
would already have been determined.
Orth was acquitted of murder under his plea of alibi. The question
arises, could the facts have been such that the jury did pass on the alibi as
the only fact in issue? Upon the basis of the hypotheticals above, carried
to a possible extreme, it would seem the answer to this question would be
in the affirmative. But the dissent in Orth did not use such reasoning. It
was maintained that the alibi removed all other matters from issue as a
matter of course and required the jury to consider only one issue: presence.
Has this contention any merit?
This liberal view of the alibi plea requires a more searching examination
of some of the rules of res judicata. It already has been presented that concessions, admissions, stipulations and reasonable certainties are not within
the domain of the jury. These are part of the judgment and amount to an
imposition on the court which cannot thereafter be altered by either party
as a means of escaping from the consequences of the decision. 54 If an alibi
can be properly construed as an admission of all allegations in the indictment except the participation of the accused, then the view of the Orth
dissent might gain ground.
The state's indictment says, in essence, that the accused committed a
robbery or attempted robbery which resulted in a homicide. The accused
answers that he could not be guilty of the acts alleged because he was not
present. He does not admit or deny the acts were committed by someone.
He only denies that the someone, if anyone, could be himself. Can it be
said that, if the state overcame the denial of presence, it would have completed its task, and that, with nothing more being offered except the bare
allegations of the indictment, the accused could be convicted? Logically
not. It follows from this, then, that an acquittal may not have been based
solely on the failure of the state to overcome the denial of presence. It may
be that the state failed to convince the jury that the accused had committed any one of the acts essential to make out an attempted robbery, or
that the death did in fact arise out of that transaction. The jury might have
fully believed the accused was guilty of robbery, but was unable to convict
53 The writer has found no case law in point.
54

Donner v. Palmer, 51 Cal. 629, 637 (1877).
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him of that offense because it was not a lesser included offense in the
indictment.
It appears that alibi is not an admission of the acts alleged any more
than it is a denial. The Orth dissent seems to be too broad. However, a
failure of the accused to contest any offers of evidence which tend to prove
that there was a robbery attempted in which a homicide occurred might
have the result, as viewed at the close of the evidence, of rendering the
proofs of such allegations too strong for reasonable men to dispute. This
would remove all of them from the domain of the jury! It would be conceivable, then, to have a case in which the matter of presence would be the
only real issue remaining at the close of the evidence." Then, res judicata
might be a very proper plea, based on this lesser issue. If it were a proper
case, a subsequent conviction of the robbery might have a result found in
another similar situation and described as: '6
... two incompatibleverdicts, which would amount to a finding on the one
hand that the defendant was not present, and on the other hand that he was
present. (Emphasis added.)
This would call for a reversal of the second conviction.
ProceduralDifficulties
The court in Orth had difficulty in finding the area in which a plea of
res judicata could be allowed, but circumvented it by the simple process of
negating its existence in a criminal proceeding of that nature. Yet the statutory plea of former judgment of the offense seems suggestive of res judicata.
Taken literally, it would seem the plea of former judgment of the offense
is redundant to that of once in jeopardy, since the latter includes the former.
This, however, was the precise construction given in Orth. Is this necessary
or logical? Applying the rules of res judicata as herein discussed, it is clear
that a former judgment of one offense can be a final determination of some
element so essential to the second indictment that it would bar the second
trial. In a practical sense, then, the second offense actually would have been
decided. This view gives substantial character to the plea of former judgment, as being declaratory of the common law. This construction is highly
inferential, but, in view of the importance of finding a proper means to raise
the plea of res judicata and the alternative view which amounts to a nullity,
such construction is plainly logical.
No special method is set out for pleading res judicata in California. The
California pleas' are identical with those in Ohio,5 applied in the Orth
case. A few California cases have allowed that it may be pleaded "in
defense," providing it is raised at the beginning of the trial "if there is a
chance."5 9 If there is no chance, the doctrine is somewhat emasculated by
55 Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S.E. 2d 573 (1941).
56 People v. Grzecyak, 77 Misc. Reps. 202, 137 N.Y.S. 538, 541 (1912).
57 CAL. PEN. CODE

§

1016.

58 O-o REV. CODE § 2943.03.
5
9Brown v. Campbell, 110 Cal. 644, 649, 43 Pac. 12, 13 (1896).
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being permitted as evidence and by "timely objection."' A failure to plead
res judicata is treated as a waiver.61 Of course, if it is pleaded the party
relying on it must produce evidence to demonstrate that it applies. 2 It
seems somewhat anomalous that a state such as California, which clearly
recognizes the doctrine in criminal cases, has failed to permit the statutory
pleas to invoke the doctrine. The difficulty could result in an inadvertant
waiver. Might this waiver rule be conflicting with the fourteenth amendment? Certainly the Oppenheimer case has opened the door to such a possibility. The possibility is left for others to examine.

Conclusion
The points which have been raised in this discussion suggest that the
doctrine of res judicata has latent features for the benefit of the criminal
law advocate. While there is substantial support in the authorities for the
limitation of the doctrine, this writer believes that such authorities can and
should be overcome by insistence on close analysis of the decisions. Acquiescence in superficial disposals of the doctrine should be avoided. Actually,
they are in need of re-examination. Cases such as State v. Orth might be
cited for their inherent weaknesses, and exposed to the filtering logic of
liberal realism, adequately provided for in the Oppenheimercase. The issue
has been joined. Future resolution should favor the accused, in harmony
with the fundamental presumption that a person is innocent until proven
guilty; a prior acquittal should be given full weight in favor of the accused
at a later trial.

60
PeopIe
61

v. Beltran, 94 Cal. App. 2d 197, 210 P.2d 238 (1949).
Domestic & Foreign Pet. Co., Ltd. v. Long, 4 Cal.2d 547, 562, 51 P.2d 73, 80 (1935).

62 Ibid.

